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Two studies compared memory performance and text comprehension of groups that were
equivalent on domain-specific knowledge but differed in overall aptitude, to investigate whether
prior knowledge about a particular domain or overall aptitude level was more important when
the task was to acquire and use new information in the domain of interest. Both studies dealt
with third-, fifuV, and seventh-grade soccer experts' and novices' memory and comprehension
of a story dealing with a soccer game. Several measures of memory performance, memory
monitoring, and text comprehension were used. Levels of soccer knowledge and of overall
aptitude were varied in a factorial design. Neither study detected significant differences between
high-aptitude and low-aptitude experts, regardless of their ages. Low aptitude experts outper-
formed high-aptitude novices on all memory and comprehension measures. The results indicate
that domain-specific knowledge can compensate for low overall aptitude on domain-related
cognitive tasks.
Since the late 1970s, a growing body of research has ex-
amined the effects of domain-specific knowledge on memory
strategies and performance on various memory tasks. These
studies showed that children's prior knowledge substantially
affects their choice of memory strategies and significantly
influences memory performance (see Bjorklund, 1985; Chi &
Ceci, 1987; Ornstein & Naus, 1985; Rabinowitz & Chi, 1987;
Schneider & Pressley, 1989, for reviews). Undoubtedly, the
most impressive evidence stems from studies contrasting the
performance of experts and novices in a specific domain.
Examples include studies of baseball expertise (Chiesi, Spilich,
& Voss, 1979; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979),
studies of problem-solving in physics (e.g., Chi, Glaser, &
Rees, 1982), and studies comparing chess experts' and nov-
ices' strategies and moves (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, 1978).
In one of the few developmental studies using the expert-
novice paradigm, Chi (1978) was even able to demonstrate
that child experts outperformed adult novices when the task
was to memorize chess positions. From this study, it can be
concluded that differences in domain-specific knowledge may
outweigh all other memory differences between children and
adults and can lead to impressive reversals of age-related
improvements in cognitive performance. The superiority of
the experts' performance was attributed to the impact of then-
rich domain-specific knowledge, which enabled them to rec-
ognize many domain-relevant patterns automatically and to
solve domain-specific problems.
Given the powerful effects of domain-specific knowledge, a
related question of interest—and the one of particular interest
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in this study—is whether rich knowledge in a specific domain
can compensate for low overall aptitude. Findings derived
from the expert-novice paradigm suggest that individual dif-
ferences in general reasoning skills as assessed in traditional
psychometric intelligence tests do not prove important in
distinguishing expert and novice performance. According to
more recent conceptualizations of intelligence, high-aptitude
individuals possess factual knowledge in many domains,
whereas low-aptitude individuals lack experience in all but a
few domains (cf. Gagne, 1985; Garcia, 1981; Siegler & Rich-
ards, 1982). As psychometric intelligence tests typically sam-
ple knowledge from a wide variety of domains, the finding
that low-ability individuals usually process information less
effectively and efficiently than high-ability subjects may be
due to the fact that their information processing abilities are
assessed in domains with which they are not familiar. Hence,
tests assessing psychometric intelligence or general aptitude
may underestimate low-aptitude individuals' comprehension,
memorizing, or decision-making skills in the few domains
with which they are highly familiar. If this assumption is
correct, individual differences in global reasoning skills should
not prove important when the task is to acquire and process
new information within a domain about which all subjects
already know a lot.
Most studies using the expert-novice paradigm could not
address this issue because they typically compared experts
and novices whose overall aptitude was high (e.g., college
students, university professors). The few empirical studies
tapping this problem have yielded conflicting evidence. Brans-
ford, Stein, Shelton, and Owings (1981) compared the per-
formances of high- and low-aptitude fifth graders who were
asked to learn a passage about robots. The high-aptitude
children were clearly superior in activating preexisting knowl-
edge to draw inferences and in asking themselves relevant
questions about the information they were trying to learn.
The low-aptitude students had the potential to do so, but did
not do this spontaneously. On the other hand, Man and
Gormley (1982) analyzed the relationship between compre-
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hension ability and prior knowledge in fourth graders* recall
of structurally equivalent texts and found no effects of ability.
Instead, prior knowledge turned out to be the only powerful
predictor of memory and comprehension performance.
With regard to our question of interest, one problem with
interpreting the rinding of the two studies was that children's
domain-specific knowledge was not particularly rich in either
study. Undoubtedly, the comparison of high- and low-ability
experts in a given domain gives more important information
concerning our central issue. Thus, we decided to reanalyze
some of our data that were suited to deal with the problem.
These data stem from two studies conducted within a large-
scale research project (Korkel, 1987; Weinert et al., 1984). In
both studies, the expert-novice paradigm was used to assess
the impact of domain-specific knowledge on text comprehen-
sion and recall. The two studies were comparable in that they
investigated the influence of knowledge about soccer on com-
prehension and recall of a story about a soccer game, and in
that third, fifth, and seventh graders served as subjects. At
each age level, approximately half of the subjects were classi-
fied as soccer experts and half as novices according to their
performance on a questionnaire that tapped knowledge of
soccer rules and important soccer events. The two studies
differed, however, with regard to the dependent variables used.
Whereas memory for text details, the ability to draw infer-
ences, and the ability to detect contradictions in the text were
the major outcome measures in the first study (Weinert et al.,
1984), various additional measures of memory, strategy use,
and metamemory were available in the second study (Korkel,
1987). As several indicators of intellectual ability (i.e., psycho-
metric intelligence tests) were available in both studies, it was
possible to further subdivide the samples of soccer experts
and novices into subgroups of high- and low-aptitude chil-
dren.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. A total of 576 middle-class children (106 third graders,
236 fifth graders, and 234 seventh graders from rural and urban
schools in the Heidelberg area) participated in the study. Equal
numbers of boys and girls were included at each age level. All testing
was done in group sessions.
Measures and procedure. A 13-item questionnaire was used to
assess children's knowledge about soccer. Ten multiple-choice items
tapped subjects* knowledge about soccer rules, whereas the remaining
three items assessed knowledge about important soccer events. Each
item on the questionnaire was given a score of 1 or 0. (The maximum
score was 13.) Children with scores ranging between 8 and 13 were
classified as soccer experts, and those with scores below 8 were
considered soccer novices. To identify high- and low-aptitude subjects
within the groups of soccer experts and novices, children's scores on
the verbal aptitude component of a German cognitive ability test
(Heller, Gadicke, & Weinlader, 1985) were considered. The three
subtests used (i.e., vocabulary, sentence completion, and word clas-
sifications) assessed children's verbal comprehension as well as verbal
reasoning skills. Mean scores obtained for our sample did not signif-
icantly differ from those reported by Heller et al. (1985), regardless
of age and type of task under consideration.
At each grade level, those subjects scoring above the median of the
distribution were classified as low-aptitude children. As a conse-
quence, four groups were differentiated at each grade level: high-
aptitude soccer experts, low-aptitude soccer experts, high-aptitude
soccer novices, and low-aptitude soccer novices.
All subjects were presented with a narrative text dealing with a
soccer game. The story was about a young soccer player's experiences
in an important match. After a short description of the young hero
and his activities before the game, the course of action during the
game was described in detail. The story ended with a description of
the hero's physical and psychological condition after the game was
over.
Precautions were taken to ensure that most parts of the story were
easily understandable for novices. Amstad's (1978) version of the
Flesch formula was used to assess text readability. This formula yields
values ranging from low readability (0) to high readability (100). The
average score obtained for our story (M = 80) indicated that the text
was easily readable for the different age groups under study. In
addition, a structural analysis of the text based on the grammar of
Mandler and Johnson (1977; Johnson & Mandler, 1980) revealed
that the story could be considered simple and well-structured accord-
ing to the criteria of these authors.
However, there were a few exceptions to this rule. Occasionally,
sentences were shortened; that is, important information was omitted
that had to be inferred by the reader. Moreover, several contradictions
were built into the text that could only be detected by careful
monitoring. For example, the hero was first described as a fast soccer
player, but later referred to as very slow and sluggish. Though prior
knowledge about soccer was important in order to draw correct
inferences, it was not always necessary to detect the contradictions in
the text.
The story was taped and presented twice to the subjects. While
listening to the story, they had an opportunity to read a written
version simultaneously. Children were told that it was most important
to listen to the story carefully, but that the written version of the text
could serve as additional support. About 15 min later, subjects were
given a 10-item questionnaire that tapped memory for text details,
detection of contradictions in the text, and the ability to draw correct
inferences. Each item on the questionnaire was given a score of 1 to
0; a maximum score of 4 was possible for the memory variable, and
a maximum score of 3 was possible for each of the text comprehension
variables.
Results
Previous analyses had yielded significant effects of grade
and the knowledge base on these three dependent variables:
Older children and soccer experts remembered more text
details, drew more correct inferences, and detected more
contradictions in the text (Weinert et al., 1984). No significant
interactions were found in these analyses. The major question
of interest in this secondary analysis of the data was whether
the subdivision of experts and novices into high- and low-
aptitude children described above would lead to a different
pattern of results. Preliminary analyses revealed that there
were no significant differences in the knowledge base of high-
versus low-aptitude soccer experts, regardless of age. On the
average, experts answered about 10 out of 13 questions on
the soccer knowledge questionnaire correctly. Performance
ranged from a mean of 9.8 (third graders) to 10.6 (seventh
graders). Not surprisingly, novices' performances were consid-
erably lower and ranged from an average of 5.3 points (third
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graders) to 6.1 points (seventh graders). Differences among
novice groups were not significant.
Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations for all
three dependent variables as a function of aptitude, grade,
and expertise. These data were analyzed in three 2 x 3 x 2
(Aptitude x Grade x Expertise) factorial analyses of variance
(ANOVAS) with memory for text details, correct inferences,
and detection of contradictions as dependent variables.
With regard to memory for text details, there was no effect
of aptitude, and no significant interactions were found. Sig-
nificant main effects were found for grade, F{2, 564) = 8.83,
M S > 0.63, p < .01, and expertise, F{U 564) = 13.61, MSt =
0.63, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons (Student-Newman-Keuls
tests) revealed that on the average, fifth and seventh graders
remembered more than third graders but did not differ from
each other. Moreover, it was found that the two expert groups
did not differ from each other but were better than the two
novice groups, which showed comparable memory perform-
ance.
With regard to the correct inferences variable, there were
again no significant effects of aptitude, and no significant
interactions. Significant main effects were found for grade,
F\2, 564) = 14.25, MSe - 0.98, p < .01, and expertise, F{U
564) = 94.69, MSe - 0.83, p < .01. Subsequent Student-
Newman-Keuls tests revealed that seventh graders drew more
correct inferences than fifth graders, who in turn scored higher
than third graders. The two expert groups did not differ from
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for the Three Dependent
Variables of Experiment I as a Function of Grade,
Expertise, and Aptitude
Group
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Text details
(range: 0-4)
M
2.32
2.38
2.02
2.01
2.88
2.94
2.28
2.20
2.73
3.02
2.48
2.63
SD
Grade
0.72
0.67
0.77
0.75
Grade
0.79
0.84
0.75
0.91
Grade
0.77
0.67
0.67
0.55
Variable
Inferences
(range: 0-3)
M
3
1.71
1.8$,
 :
0.60
0.83
5
2.25
2.49
1.36
1.48
7
2.50
2.59
1.99
1.72
SD
0.95
1.26
0.63
0.60
0.77
0.72
0.79
1.08
0.79
0.71
0.93
0.99
Contradictions
(range: 0-3)
M
0.22
0.29
0.07
0.07
1.16
0.92
0.56
0.29
1.50
1.11
0.88
0.77
SD
0.44
0.46
0.26
0.26
0.69
0.76
0.52
0.46
0.79
0.84
0.60
0.75
each other but were significantly better than the two novice
groups, who showed equivalent performance.
In the ANOVA on detection of contradictions, significant
effects were found for grade, F{2t 564) = 48.49, MSt = 0.48,
p < .01, and expertise, F{1, 564) = 28.27, A/& = 0.54, p <
.01. Further, the Aptitude X Grade interaction was significant,
F{2, 564) = 3.17, p < .05. Post hoc analyses revealed that
seventh graders detected more contradictions than fifth grad-
ers, who in turn were better than third graders. Again, the two
expert groups did not differ from each other but were better
than the two novice groups, who showed comparable perform-
ance. This finding, however, was qualified by the Aptitude X
Grade interaction: Whereas the high-aptitude children out-
performed the low-aptitude children in seventh grade, apti-
tude did not make a difference in third and fifth graders.
These findings indicate that performance on the three de-
pendent variables was generally dependent on the children's
knowledge base, at any age. That is, in all age groups, soccer
experts recalled more text details, drew more correct infer-
ences, and on the average detected more contradictions in the
text than did soccer novices. Interestingly, the distinction
between soccer experts and novices of different aptitude levels
did not change this general pattern of findings. For all three
dependent measures, the low-aptitude experts scored signifi-
cantly higher than the high-aptitude novices. The fact that
high- and low-aptitude experts performed almost equally on
all three dependent variables is in accord with the assumption
that low-aptitude subjects are able to process information
effectively in a domain with which they are familiar.
It should be noted, however, that the empirical evidence of
Experiment 1 was restricted in that the dependent variables
measuring text recall and comprehension consisted of only a
few items. For example, comparing memory for a few text
details in groups of high- and low-aptitude children does not
provide any information about possible quantitative and qual-
itative differences in high- and low-aptitude children's text
processing. Analyses of free recall protocols seem much better
suited to explore this issue. Similarly, the measures of text
comprehension (i.e., inferences, detection of contradictions)
used in Experiment 1 were not comprehensive enough to
allow for more general conclusions. For instance, it appears
that individual differences in general abilities are correlated
with individual differences in declarative as well as procedural
metacognitive knowledge, which in turn tend to affect the
quality of text processing (see Korkel, 1987; Schneider, 1985).
Accordingly, measures of procedural and declarative meta-
cognitive knowledge should also be included to evaluate the
relative impact of expertise and aptitude on text comprehen-
sion and recall. Experiment 2 (Korkel, 1987) seemed better
suited to serve these purposes because several indicators of
metacognitive knowledge and memory for test were available
in this study.
Experiment 2
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 185 middle-class children (64 third
graders, 67 fifth graders, 54 seventh graders). Children were selected
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from two public schools located near Heidelberg, West Germany. An
equal number of boys and girls were included at each age level.
Measures and procedure. Several variables assessed in Experi-
ment 1 were also available in Experiment 2. For example, an identical
measure of verbal intelligence, the same questionnaire assessing
knowledge about soccer, and the same story about a soccer game
were used in both studies. As a consequence, the classification of
soccer experts and novices with different aptitude levels in Experi-
ment 2 followed the principles of classification reported for Experi-
ment 1.
As already noted, the major advantage of Experiment 2 concerned
the selection of dependent measures. Three different memory per-
formance variables were assessed: First, subjects freely recalled the
soccer story. The instruction was that the children should do their
best to recall the story as accurately and comprehensively as possible.
The recall protocols were analyzed according to the procedure devel-
oped by Mandler and Johnson (1977), that is, in terms of "semantic1*
or idea units. At maximum, 36 different idea units could be repro-
duced.
A cloze test was used as a second measure of (supported) recall.
All subjects were presented with a written version of the story that
included 20 blanks, and were asked to fill the gaps as accurately as
possible. One point was given for each correct completion of the text
(maximum score of 20).
Finally, a recognition test was given. The whole test consisted of
24 sentences. In addition to 11 "old," that is, original sentences, 13
"new," abstractor sentences were included. Precautions were taken to
ensure that the distractor sentences referred to the course of action
described in the soccer story, and that they were difficult to identify,
that is, that they were similar to old sentences not included in the
recognition test. One point was given for each correct identification
of an original sentence and for each correct rejection of a distractor
sentence. (The maximum possible score was 24.)
In addition to the three performance measures, several indicators
of strategic operations and metacognitive processes were available in
this study. These indicators included subjects' importance ratings of
the text, their performance prediction for the free recall task, their
feeling-of-knowing judgments when completing the cloze test, and
their declarative metacognitive knowledge about text recall.
The importance rating procedure is a very popular tool in the area
of text memory and comprehension (see Brown, Bransford, Ferrara,
& Campione, 1983, for a review). The version used in this study
required the children to select and underline those 10 sentences in
the soccer text that they considered the most important and necessary
for an efficient reproduction of the text. Children's importance ratings
were then compared with an "ideal*5 importance rating of the text
based on the judgments of 20 adult soccer experts (students and
faculty members of different departments at the University of Hei-
delberg). One point was given when a sentence judged as important
corresponded with a sentence selected as important by the adult
experts (maximum score of 10).
Immediately after the importance rating procedure, subjects were
asked to predict the number of sentences they could freely recall if
asked to do so. Prediction accuracy was assessed by relating perform-
ance prediction and actual performance in the free recall task. More
precisely, it was defined as the absolute value of the difference between
the recall estimate and actual recall, divided by recall. According to
this formula, smaller scores correspond with better prediction accu-
racy.
With regard to the feeling-of-knowing judgments, the relevant
information was taken from the cloze test. When completing the
blanks in the cloze test, subjects were asked to indicate whether the
completion of the text was correct or incorrect in their opinion.
Correct evaluations, that is, hits (i.e., both completion and evaluation
correct) and correct rejections (i.e., completion incorrect and evalu-
ation correct) were summed, yielding a maximum score of 20.
Finally, children's declarative metacognitive knowledge (meta-
memory) about text processing and recall was assessed by using a 17-
item questionnaire modeled after the interviews developed by
Kreutzer, Leonard, and Flavell (1975) and Myers and Paris (1978).
One point was given for each item, thus yielding a maximum score
of 17.
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed that there were no significant
expert/novice differences for two measures, namely the rec-
ognition test and the questionnaire assessing declarative me-
tacognitive knowledge. Not surprisingly, subdividing experts
and novices according to aptitude level did not change the
pattern of results. As a consequence, the findings for those
two measures will not be discussed in detail here.
Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for the
remaining two memory variables as a function of aptitude,
grade, and expertise. These data were analyzed in two 2 x 3
x 2 (Aptitude x Grade X Expertise) factorial ANOVAS with
free recall and supported recall (cloze test) as dependent
variables.
With regard to free recall, there was no effect of aptitude,
and no significant interactions. Significant main effects were
found for grade, F{2, 173) = 18.28, MSC = 20.51, p < .01,
and expertise, FiU 173) = 103.18, MS, = 14.20, p < .01.
Subsequent Student-Newman-Keuls tests revealed that sev-
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for the Text Recall
Variables of Experiment 2 as a Function of Grade,
Expertise, and Aptitude
Group
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Free recall
(range: 4-25)
M
Grade
13.94
13.60
9.37
9.08
Grade
16.38
17.48
10.93
10.42
Grade
19.00
19.80
13.09
13.54
SD
3
3.49
3.37
3.41
3.20
5
2.35
2.71
3.44
3.30
7
3.46
3.36
5.14
4.17
Supported
recall
(range: 5-20)
M
17.22
18.40
14.91
15.08
16.90
17.33
14.61
14.53
17.60
17.10
15.81
15.46
SD
1.69
1.07
2.28
3.50
1.93
1.15
1.99
2.22
1.27
1.37
2.52
2.75
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enth graders recalled more than fifth graders, who in turn
were better than third graders. The two expert groups did not
differ from each other but were significantly better than the
two novice groups, who showed equivalent performance.
The findings for supported recall were different in that no
main effect for grade was found. There was no effect of
aptitude, and no significant interactions. The main effect of
expertise proved significant, F{it 173) = 40.92, MS< = 3.90,
p < .01. Again, the two expert groups did not differ from each
other but were better than the two novice groups, who showed
comparable performance.
Taken together, the findings for the two memory perform-
ance variables parallel those obtained for the memory per-
formance variable in Experiment 1. There were pronounced
differences between experts and novices, and the distinction
between different levels of aptitude did not change this general
pattern of results. The high- and low-aptitude experts per-
formed almost equally on the two dependent variables, and
there were also no differences in high- and low-aptitude
novices' memory performances.
Although these findings seem to indicate that children with
different aptitude levels can process new information in a
familiar domain equally well, a more conclusive answer to
this question can be obtained by directly analyzing the text-
related strategies and metacognitive processes (i.e., memory
monitoring) children used while memorizing and compre-
hending the text information. The three variables to be con-
sidered in this context are the quality of subjects* importance
ratings, their feeling-of-knowing judgments concerning the
appropriateness of their text completion on the cloze test, and
their estimates or predictions of free recall.
Table 3 contains the means and standard deviations for
these three variables as a function of grade, expertise, and
aptitude. These data were analyzed in three 2 x 3 x 2
(Aptitude x Grade x Expertise) factorial ANOVAS, with im-
portance rating, feeling of knowing, and prediction accuracy
as the dependent variables.
With regard to importance rating, the main effect of apti-
tude was nonsignificant. Significant effects were found for
grade, F(2t 173) = 3.97, MSe = 2.35, p < .05, and expertise,
F{U 173) - 49.87, MS* = 1.87, p < .01. Seventh graders
selected more important sentences than fifth graders, who in
turn were superior to third graders. The pattern of results for
expertise resembled those found for the memory performance
variables: The two expert groups did not differ from each
other, but were significantly better than the two novice groups,
who showed equivalent performance.
The latter finding was also true for the two memory mon-
itoring variables (i.e., feeling of knowing and prediction ac-
curacy). The Fs(l, 173) concerning the effects of the expertise
variable for the feeling of knowing and prediction accuracy
variables were 22.02 and 27.68, respectively (all ps < .01).
There was a significant grade effect for feeling of knowing,
F{2y 173) = 3.56, MS* = 4.93, p < .05. Interestingly, no grade
effect was found for the prediction accuracy variable. Again,
the main effect of aptitude and all interactions were nonsig-
nificant.
Before we can accept the conclusion that individual differ-
ences in general aptitude do not have an impact on text
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for the Strategy Use and
Memory Monitoring Variables of Experiment 2 as a
Function of Grade, Expertise, and Aptitude
Group
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Experts
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Novices
High aptitude
Low aptitude
Importance
rating
(range: 0-9)
M
4.33
4.50
2.98
2.88
5.20
4.83
3.67
3.67
5.80
5.90
4.07
3.92
SD
Grade
1.83
1.83
1.70
1.03
Grade
1.46
1.80
1.18
1.01
Variable
Feeling of
knowing
(range: 8-20)
M
3
16.05
16.80
12.70
13.00
5
16.03
16.66
14.67
14.62
Grade 7
1.32
1.28
1.53
1.38
16.20
16.00
13.36
14.09
SD
3.28
2.40
3.44
3.71
1.72
1.46
2.07
2.54
1.64
2.05
3.00
1.60
Performance
prediction
(range: 0-
1.2)
M
0.21
0.23
0.50
0.46
0.30
0.24
0.59
0.56
0.14
0.23
0.47
0.45
SD
0.19
0.11
0.55
0.22
0.17
0.25
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.15
0.22
0.35
comprehension and recall in an area with which subjects are
particularly familiar, we must address one theoretically im-
portant objection to the way we analyzed the data. That is,
our decision to conflate the continuous knowledge and apti-
tude variables into dichotomous variables implied that a
substantial amount of inherent variance was ignored. As a
consequence, the probability of finding an effect when one
existed was reduced. To test the assumption that our failure
to find significant effects of aptitude was due to this method-
ological problem, we conducted all ANOVAS of Experiment 2
again within a regression model, using the continuous knowl-
edge and intelligence variables as predictor variables. In short,
the various multiple regression analyses generally replicated
the results reported above. With the exception of the impor-
tance rating measure in third grade, where general aptitude
accounted for about 10% of the explained variance, its impact
on the dependent measures was consistently low and insignif-
icant Typically, general aptitude explained between 1 % and
3% of the variance in the dependent measures. On the other
hand, domain-specific knowledge significantly predicted text
recall and comprehension, regardless of the dependent vari-
able and age group under consideration. Knowledge usually
accounted for more than 25 % of the variance in the dependent
variables, reaching a maximum of 45% for free recall in
seventh graders.
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In sum, then, the findings obtained for the dependent
variables used in Experiment 2 support the assumption that
individual differences in general abilities as assessed in psy-
chometric intelligence tests do not prove important in distin-
guishing expert and novice performance.
General Discussion
The two studies summarized in this article assessed the
respective roles of domain-specific knowledge and general
aptitudes in influencing various aspects of text comprehension
and recall. In Experiment 1, soccer experts and novices were
compared on their ability to memorize text details, to draw
inferences, and to detect contradictions in the text. Not sur-
prisingly, experts outperformed novices on all three outcome
measures. More interestingly, the distinction between soccer
experts and novices of different aptitude levels did not change
this pattern of findings. That is, high- and low-aptitude experts
did not differ from each other.
This somewhat unexpected finding was validated by the
results of Experiment 2. Hence, it was shown that domain-
specific knowledge affected (unassisted and supported) text
recall, whereas recognition performance was comparable for
experts and novices. These results suggest an interaction be-
tween knowledge level and form of test: The soccer expert
groups performed well regardless of form of test, whereas the
novice groups did better as more prompts were provided for
memory. As in Experiment 1, groups of high- and low-
aptitude experts did not differ from each other but were clearly
superior to the two novice groups. A similar pattern of results
was found for the strategy and memory monitoring variables
assessed in Experiment 2, thus demonstrating that experts
differing in general aptitude were comparable in their strategic
processes and memory monitoring skills.
Interestingly, declarative metacognitive knowledge did not
differ for the four experimental groups, and its impact on text
recall and comprehension was negligible compared with that
of the two memory monitoring variables (i.e., feeling of
knowing and prediction accuracy). This rinding is in line with
several recent studies showing that procedural metacognitive
knowledge seems a better predictor of text recall, as compared
to declarative metacognitive knowledge (see Schneider, 1985,
for a review).
By and large, then, the findings of the two studies support
the conclusion that children's prior knowledge about text
contents is a much more powerful predictor of their text
comprehension and recall than their general intellectual abil-
ity. The results, thus, confirm the findings of Marr and
Gormley (1982) that subjects' prior knowledge and not their
general comprehension ability was a crucial factor in explain-
ing performance. It appears, then, that rich domain-specific
knowledge can compensate for low overall aptitude on do-
main-related cognitive tasks.
However, we would still hesitate to generalize these find-
ings. It should be noted that our soccer story was well struc-
tured in most parts and easily readable even for third graders.
The discrepancy between our results and those obtained by
Bransford et al. (1981) could be at least partly due to the fact
that their robot story was more difficult to understand and
required the ability to draw more complex inferences than
was necessary for the children in our studies.
A second reason for the discrepancy between the results of
our study and those reported by Bransford et al. (1981) could
be the differing levels of expertise observed in the two studies.
Though our soccer experts had a pronounced knowledge of
soccer rules and important soccer events, the amount of
knowledge about robots and their functioning was probably
comparably modest even in Bransford et al.'s good learner
subjects. It seems, then, that the relative impact of knowledge
on text recall and comprehension may vary as a function of
task difficulty and the richness of domain-specific knowledge:
The more difficult the task demands and the less pronounced
the available task-specific knowledge, the more important are
strategic processes and general comprehension abilities.
It should be noted, however, that two recently published
studies on expertise in a different domain (baseball) provide
additional confirmation for the validity of our findings (see
Recht & Leslie, 1988; Walker, 1987). Walker (1987; Experi-
ment 2) compared high- and low-aptitude adults who were
either baseball experts or novices. When presented with a
baseball text passage, low-aptitude/high-knowledge subjects
recalled more information than high-aptitude/low-knowledge
subjects. In addition, the two expert groups differing with
regard to general aptitude recalled similar amounts of impor-
tant information and made equivalent numbers of goal-rele-
vant inferences. Recht and Leslie investigated how domain-
specific knowledge influences text recall and comprehension
of high-knowledge versus low-knowledge seventh- and eighth
grade children differing in reading ability. Children had to
read a baseball text passage and then reenact the action
described in the text nonverbally, retell the story, summarize
the text, and sort sentences chosen randomly from the passage
on the basis of importance of ideas to the text. On all depend-
ent measures, children with greater knowledge of baseball
recalled more than did children with less knowledge. There
was no main effect of reading ability, and no significant
interaction between reading ability and domain-specific
knowledge. As Recht and Leslie emphasized, students with
high reading ability but low knowledge of baseball were no
more capable of recall or summarization than were students
with low reading ability and low knowledge of baseball.
Obviously, the findings presented in the studies by Recht
and Leslie (1988) and Walker (1987), as well as those obtained
in our study, have direct instructional implications. An im-
pressive result of our study was that even third-grade soccer
experts were able to judge adequately the importance of
specific text units for later recall, a competence usually not
emerging before fifth or sixth grade (see Brown et al., 1983;
Schneider, 1985, for reviews). In other words, most low-
aptitude soccer experts were well able to show competencies
related to academic success in school when they were highly
familiar with the contents and also extremely interested and
motivated to work on the task. In light of the importance of
domain-specific knowledge, strategy instruction and the
knowledge base should be considered equally in the design of
instruction. As recommended by Walker, one way to teach
general cognitive abilities such as organizing, inferencing, and
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comprehension monitoring is in the context of specific knowl-
edge domains. It seems important first to identify low-aptitude
learners' preexisting strengths in addition to diagnosing their
processing weaknesses, and then to teach these learners to
exploit their capabilities in other domains and other task
situations.
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